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Discussion Topics
 ASRS Metrics and Alerts
 Maintenance Personnel Report Data
 “Aircraft Taxi, Tow, or Pushback Gone 
Wrong ”
• Review of relevant events
Monthly Intake
January 1981 – February 2018
ASRS Report Volume Profile
Aviation Safety Reporting System
 Approaching 42 years
of confidential safety 
reporting
 Over 1,522,000 reports 
received
 Over 6,400 alert 
messages issued
 Over 7,858 reports per 
month, or 377 per 
working day
 Total report intake for 
2017 was 94,302
 Current rate estimate 
for 2018 is over 95,000
Incident Reporter Distribution
January 2017 – February 2018
n = 106,961
Source:  100% ASRS Report Data
 ASAP Reporting  
• 243 Total Programs
• 123 Air Carriers/Operators
 Reporting Groups
• 117 Pilot
• 57 Maintenance
• 43 Dispatch
• 23 Flight Attendant
• 3 Other (Including Ground Crew, etc.)
 Majority are received through Secure Electronic Data 
Transmission protocols 
 Paper form submissions continue to be received at ASRS 
ASAP Reporting to ASRS
ASRS Electronic Transmission 
Methodology compatible with 
numerous software platforms
More programs being
added continuously
27.4% of all reports are matched to unique events in 2017
Aviation Safety Reporting System
Report Processing Flow
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Maintenance Related Alert Messages 
 Maintenance Alert Message Examples
• Possible Virus On Remote Data Station (RDS) 
• B767 Cabin Air Quality
• PBE Explosion During Disposal 
• Flight Crew Oxygen Mask Issues
• B787 Nose Landing Gear Pin Installation Issue
• B737-800 Loss of Manual and Electric Stab Trim
• Airbus A319 Windshield Inner Pane Structural Failure
• EMB-175 Aileron Anomaly
• A319 Series Nose Gear Steering Anomaly
Maintenance Personnel Report Data 
100% of Reports Received
 ASRS report data includes 
Maintenance Personnel incident 
reports received between Jan 1, 2012 
– Feb 28, 2018
 Charts tabulated:
• Year/Month
• Aircraft Make Model
• Event Anomalies
*Data references 100% of reports received.
Maintenance Personnel Report Data 
100% of Reports Received (Jan 1, 2012 – Feb 28, 2018)
*2018 data complete through February 28, 2018.
n = 13,769
*
Data references 100% of reports received.
Maintenance Personnel Report Data 
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Categories are not mutually exclusive.  Therefore, a single incident may be coded by ASRS analysts as involving more than one anomaly.
Data references 100% of reports received.
Maintenance Personnel Report Data 
100% of Reports Received (Jan 1, 2012 – Feb 28, 2018)
n = 13,769
Event Anomalies Number of Incidents
Published Material / Policy 11,437
Maintenance Procedure 8,030
Aircraft Equipment Problem - Less Severe 3,843
MEL 1,267
FAR 849
Aircraft Equipment Problem - Critical 236
Ground Event / Encounter with Object 211
Ground Event / Encounter with Vehicle 108
Ground Event / Encounter with Aircraft 68
Clearance 64
Hazardous Material Violation 52
Runway Incursion 44
Aircraft Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor 37
Weight and Balance 32
Taxiway Incursion 26
ASRS Maintenance Personnel Safety Reports
Aircraft Taxi, Tow, or Pushback Gone Wrong –
ASRS Review of Maintenance Reports with 
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
CAST Safety Enhancements (SE002, SE014, SE015, SE026, SE049, SE050, SE051, SE052, SE131, SE169, SE176, SE219, SE221)
 ASRS has received several Maintenance 
Personnel reports describing Taxi, Tow, or 
Pushback situations that resulted in 
undesirable outcome
 Damage to aircraft, equipment and injuries 
were reported
“Aircraft Taxi, Tow, or Pushback Gone Wrong – ASRS Review of 
Maintenance Reports with Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome”
Technician Reported
“Control Tower told us that we were cleared to cross [runway] and 
expedite as there was another aircraft about to land. I started to 
advance engine throttles to expedite runway and saw aircraft getting 
closer to landing and I heard my taxi partner saying "go ahead, 
expedite". … We wanted to cross the runway and clear the path for 
the aircraft to land (and avoid a collision). I lost control of the aircraft 
trying to clear the runway.” (Report 1288221)
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Runway Excursion”
Lead Technician Reported
“… With the engine running and amps at a good level, I started the left 
engine. I checked the oil pressures and hydraulic pressures. I called ground 
[control] for clearance to taxi to [FBO ramp]. With clearance I pushed the 
brake off and started rolling. I went to turn and had no nose wheel steering. 
I applied the brakes and had no brakes. I pulled the parking brake handle 
and had no results. I was closing in on the hangar in front of me and shut 
down the engines to avoid damage to the engines. I impacted the hangar 
right after that. …. After a bit of time talking to the [airport personnel] I then 
thought of squat switches as a possible problem and found the squat 
switches were manually placed in air mode.” (Report 1300292)
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Hangar Impact”
Technician Reported
“….aircraft was pushed back from the gate. We performed 
engine start checks, then started engine. I…called for taxi and 
we get clearance from Tower. Mechanic Y reports no brakes or 
steering. I try my brakes, no stop. I then armed thrust reverses 
and pull back on thrust reverser levers. I saw on the EICAS the 
thrust reverser did activate but not soon enough to stop us. … 
Aircraft damage. Struck against an aircraft.” (Report 1260604)
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Throw out the anchor!”
Six Technicians Reported: Tug Driver and Radio 
Operator, Brake Rider, Left and Right Wing 
Walkers, and Tail Walker
This graphic is for illustrative purposes only and not to be used for any other purpose.
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Tow Team Warning System”
This graphic is for illustrative purposes only and not to be used for any other purpose.
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Tow Team Warning System”
Technician (Tail Walker): “… We were in process of relocating aircraft and the 
right wingtip struck the right elevator of [another aircraft]. I did not see that the 
aircraft was going to hit the other aircraft. I was using the regular wand at the 
time. Taxi tow warning system failed. I felt rushed and in a time constraint 
situation. As do all the other team members in the move. I don't think we should 
be pressured and rushed to accomplish my work in a safe manner. Because 
they called me to accomplish a move that takes about 1/2 hour I don't think there 
was enough time afforded me for a safe move.” (Report 1386260)
This graphic is for illustrative purposes only and not to be used for any other purpose.
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Tow Team Warning System”
Technician (Tug driver): “…during pushback struck an aircraft parked behind…. 
The TTWS is only tested prior to our first move of the day and then left armed 
until we clock out and leave for the day. The [tug] is shared equipment, and the 
system was turned off prior to this move. The TTWS should be on and armed 
once the tug is started. It should not have the ability to be switched off.”
(Report 1386256)
This graphic is for illustrative purposes only and not to be used for any other purpose.
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Tow Team Warning System”
Technician (Wing Walker): “… I was wing walking and facing the driver of the 
tug vehicle but because of the glare on the windshield I could not see the driver's 
face. I assumed the push was going on as normal. The driver is very skilled and 
familiar with this area. When I realized he may possibly not see what was going 
on I pressed the button for the TTWS to warn him that he was getting close. I 
kept pressing the button as he was not stopping I was not sure if there was 
failure of his brakes or my wand. It came to the point where I panicked and 
started waving…. The TTWS system should be tied into the power of the tug so 
that when the tug is on the system is on. Also maybe a notification on the wand 
that it is communicating with the tug” (Report 1386261)
Two Technicians Reported
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Tail Watch”
Technician 1 (Brake Rider): “… On our short drive up to the ramp, we 
noticed the Food Service Truck was still at the aircraft. I commented about it 
and everyone acknowledged. ... (I) went directly to the cockpit to get the 
airplane fired up and running while the others get the tug hooked up, pull 
chocks and ground power. It took a few minutes for me to get the airplane 
ready and shortly after the call came from the ground crew that they were 
ready to push. I asked the tug driver ‘are those guys clear’ in reference to the 
Food Service Truck. The response was we're clear….  I was told to ‘release 
brakes’ and give the tower a call. I called and got clearance to reposition and 
we were given ‘clear to push, KILO to the gate’. We started moving and I 
heard someone yell ‘STOP’. That was the Food Service worker. The tug driver 
called up, ‘did we hit that truck?’ … We really should have had our ‘tail watch’ 
remain with the tug driver until the area was clear….” (Report 1437317)
Two Technicians Reported
Unintended Aircraft Movement Outcome
“Tail Watch”
Technician 2: “…The north ramp is a very isolated and a dark 
area with nothing to impede aircraft movement. Normally there 
isn't any equipment in the area so the food truck was out of the 
norm. Our normal process is to have a tail watch in the event 
there's traffic on the service road to block traffic. Our tail watch 
was at the service road and couldn't contact me quick enough to 
stop the accident.” (Report 1437319)
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
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